Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
关于修改《天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法》的决定
天津市人民政府
关于修改《天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法》的决定
天津市人民政府令第123号
《关于修改〈天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法〉的决定》已经市人民政府批准，现予发布施行。
市人民政府决定对《天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法》（1991年市人民政府令第36号）作如下修改：
一、将第四条修改为：“市交通运输主管部门是道路危险货物运输的行政主管部门，具体工作由市道路运输管理机构负责。”
二、将有关条款中的“机关”改为“机构”。
三、将第四十三条修改为：“对无道路危险货物运输经营许可证、道路危险货物非营业运输许可证或道路危险货物运输中转许可证而从事危险货物运输及临时存放业务的单位，责令停止营业，并可对非经营性活动处1000元以下罚款，对经营性活动并有违法所得的处3万元以下罚款
，无违法所得的处1万元以下罚款。
对伪造、涂改、转让、出卖、借用道路危险货物运输经营许可证、道路危险货物非营业运输许可证或道路危险货物运输中转许可证的单位，收缴有关证件，并可对非经营性活动处1000元以下罚款，对经营性活动并有违法所得的处3万元以下罚款，无违法所得的处1万元以下罚款。
对隐瞒事故不报告的单位，处1000元以上1万元以下罚款，并责令限期改正。”
四、将第四十四条中的“处一千元以上三千元以下（含三千元）罚款：”改为“处1000元以上1万元以下罚款：”将第（一）项修改为：“无道路运输证件，从事危险货物运输的；”
五、将第四十五条中的“处三百元以上五百元以下（含五百元）罚款：”改为“处500元以下罚款：”
六、将第四十八条、第五十一条、第五十二条删除。
七、将第五十三条修改为：“本办法自发布之日起施行。”
有关条款删除后，序号作相应调整。
本决定自发布之日起施行。
《天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法》根据本决定作相应的修正，重新发布。
天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法
（1991年7月23日市人民政府发布1998年1月4日根据市人民政府《关于修改〈天津市道路危险货物运输管理办法〉的决定》修订发布）
第一章 总 则
第一条 为加强道路危险货物运输管理，保障人民生命财产安全，根据国家有关规定，结合本市具体情况，制定本办法。
第二条 凡具有爆炸、易燃、毒害、腐蚀、放射性等性质、在运输、装卸、搬倒、打包、联运服务（以下简称危险货物运输）及在运输过程中临时存放，容易造成人身伤亡和财产损毁而需特别防护的货物，均属危险货物运输管理的范围。
道路运输危险货物的品名，以交通部《关于发布〈汽车运输危险货物品名表〉的通知》（〔91〕交运字163号）为准。
第三条 本办法适用于本市所辖行政区域内，从事道路危险货物运输的单位和在生产、销售、储存危险货物过程中，需经道路运输的单位。
从事危险货物运输的司机、装卸、打包、保管、押运、管理等作业人员均应遵守本办法。
第四条 市交通运输主管部门是道路危险货物运输的行政主管部门，具体工作由市道路运输管理机构负责。
第二章 运输资格审查登记程序
第五条 从事营业性危险货物运输的单位，需具备定车、定人、定任务、定防护用品及其清洗点、定车辆清洗消毒点等专业化运输条件，分别经公安、交通、环保部门审查批准后，由市道路运输管理机构发给道路危险货物运输经营许可证，方可承运。
停办危险货物运输的，应在三十天前向市道路运输管理机构提出书面报告，注销原领取的道路危险货物运输经营许可证。
第六条 企事业单位自备车辆，从事提取、运送本单位危险货物的，需持本单位申请书和上级安全技术部门书面证明，向市道路运输管理机构申请，经公安、交通、环保部门批准后，由市道路运输管理机构发给道路危险货物非营业运输许可证，方可运输。
第七条 设置供危险货物运输过程中，临时存放危险品专用停车场地的，应向市道路运输管理机构提出书面申请，经公安、交通、环保部门审核批准，发给开业证明，再向工商行政管理部门申请领取营业执照，根据营业执照和开业证明，由市道路运输管理机构核发道路危险货物运输中
转许可证后，方可开业。
停办危险货物临时存放业务的，应在三十天前向市道路运输管理机构提出书面报告，注销原领取的道路危险货物运输中转许可证。
第三章 托 运
第八条 危险货物托运人应向具有道路危险货物运输经营许可证的单位或到市道路运输管理机构指定的危险货物运输业务受理站，办理托运危险货物运输的手续。
第九条 托运下列危险货物，应持有关证件：
（一）爆炸物品，应有市公安机关签发的爆炸物品运输证；
（二）一级毒害品（即剧毒品、烈性毒品），应有市公安机关签发的剧毒物品运输证；
（三）放射性物品，应在市环保、公安、卫生等部门共同审查同意后，持有公安机关签发的放射性物品运输许可证和卫生部门签发的放射性物品剂量检查证明书或放射性同位素、空容器检查证明书；
（四）感染性物品，应分别有市卫生防疫或兽医卫生检疫部门签发的卫生检疫证明和消毒证明；
（五）麻醉药品、精神药品，托运人应在托运单的发货人记事栏内，分别加盖卫生部门的麻醉药品专用章或精神药品专用章；
（六）使用集装箱装运危险货物时，除持有上述证明外，还需要有商品检验部门签发的集装箱危险货物装箱证明书和港务监督部门的证明。
两种以上危险货物的性能有抵触的，必须分别托运。
第十条 托运未列入汽车运输危险货物品名表的其他危险货物，需持交通部统一印发的危险货物鉴定表，由上级主管部门审核签章，经市道路运输管理机构批准后，方可办理运输手续。
第十一条 托运爆炸品、一级毒害品、放射性物品和需要特殊防护的危险货物，托运人应指派懂得危险货物性能，有应急经验，熟悉业务的押运人员，负责运输的安全指导；危险货物运输作业人员，应服从押运人员的安全指导和应急安排。
运输作业人员和车辆需要的急救用品和特殊防护用品，由托运人提供。
第十二条 危险货物的包装、容器，应符合交通部《公路、水路危险货物包装基本要求和性能试验》规定，具有适合道路运输的规定强度和膨涨余量，且须坚固、完整，严密不漏，表面清洁。
对与国家标准不同的进口原包装危险货物，如包装完整无损，符合安全运输要求，应注明“进口原包装”字样，可按原包装运输。
未经清洗消毒处理的危险货物空容器，必须按原装危险货物办理托运；危险货物的空容器清洗消毒后，应经卫生、环保部门检测，并开具检疫、消毒合格的证明，方可按普通货物运输。
包件外表面或集装箱的明显部位，应贴有与内装危险货物性质、分类一致的危险货物标志。
第四章 承运与交接
第十三条 承运人受理危险货物托运，须核对托运单所填写内容和要求及所提供的证件，及时勘察作业现场，检查包装情况。对包装破损或不符合包装要求的，不准承运。
第十四条 承运人起运前，应检查核实危险货物与托运单所列品名、数量是否相符，包装是否符合要求，并在运单上签章，证明托运单所列货物接收无误，同时签注装车时间。
货物送达目的地，承运人应通知收货人验收。收货人经查验包装无破损，品名、数量与运单相符后，应在运单上签章，证明货物收到无误，并签注收货时间。
第十五条 承运人不得将危险货物转让给其他单位运输。
第十六条 抵达收货地点出现所运货物数量缺少或包装破损时，交接双方应做好记录。并由承运人签章确认属实。一式两份，双方各持一份记录。其余危险货物，收货人不得拒收。
因危险货物包装破损无法收货的，应由承运人指派配备必要防护用品的专人进行看管；对丢失的危险货物由承运人负责查找，并及时与当地有关部门联系处理。
在此期间因包装破损发生事故的，由承运方负责。
第五章 车辆与设备
第十七条 从事道路危险货物运输的车辆、设备和工属具，必须符合《汽车危险货物运输规则》（ＪＴ3130－88）的有关规定；营业性车辆应在道路运输营运证上加盖道路危险货物运输许可章；非营业性车辆须持有市道路运输管理机构核发的非营业性道路危险货物车辆运输证。
第十八条 从事危险货物运输的车辆，白天行车应在车辆的左前方悬挂危险品信号旗；夜晚行车应在车顶装置危险品标志灯。信号旗和标志灯由市道路运输管理机构会同公安机关发放，按有关规定安装。
第十九条 运输危险货物的车辆，须携带与危险货物性能相关的消防器材；装运爆炸品、易燃物品、有机过氧化物的车辆，其排气管须有隔热和熄灭火星装置；装运易燃液体的罐（槽）车，须有导除静电设施。
第二十条 各种车辆的驾驶室及各类客车（含公共电、汽车），不准装运危险货物。
全挂货运列车、三轮机动车、摩托车、拖拉机、人力车、畜力车和其他特种车辆，不准装运爆炸品、一级氧化剂、有机过氧化物等危险货物。
自卸汽车只准装运散装二级非易燃的固体危险货物。
第六章 运输与装卸
第二十一条 从事危险货物运输的作业人员，应参加市交通、公安、劳动部门组织的危险货物运输知识、技术、业务知识和应急处理知识的联合培训。经考试合格后，由交通、公安、劳动部门共同核发道路危险货物运输操作证，方能上岗作业。对从事易燃易爆化学物品作业的有关人员
，还须进行消防知识的专业培训，经有关主管部门考试合格后，方可定岗位从事操作、管理。
第二十二条 危险货物作业区内，不准使用明火照明；不准吸烟、进食；装卸作业时必须轻装轻卸，防止翻滚、震动；作业人员应服从作业区安全管理人员的指挥、监督。
第二十三条 作业人员必须执行运输计划和配装规定，危险货物性能互相抵触或其消防、防护方法不同的，不能同车装运。
第二十四条 被毒害品、腐蚀品等危险货物污染的车辆、设备、工属具和场地，必须及时清洗消毒并经检验合格后，方可装运其他物资。在车厢内清扫出的残留物，应按环保部门指定地点妥善处理。
装运危险货物的专用车辆，严禁装运食用物品（含饲料）。
第二十五条 作业人员发现危险货物有下列情况之一，不准装车：
（一）所运的危险货物与托运单所列品名不符的；
（二）包装破损或不符合包装规定的；
（三）遇湿易燃物品已有水渍、雨淋痕迹的；
（四）不符合配装规定的；
（五）危险货物包装标志不清或无标志的。
第二十六条 运输危险货物的车辆，除作业人员外，严禁搭乘其他人员；作业人员在运输过程中，不准与危险货物处于同一车厢内。
第二十七条 装运由公安机关签证的危险货物的车辆，应按公安机关指定的路线、时间和车速行驶。每年六月十五日至八月三十一日为夏季作业期，在夏季作业期间每日十时至十八时停止装运易爆、易燃物品和气体。
装运不燃气体和民用液化石油气，具有通风、防晒装置的，不受时间限制。
第二十八条 危险货物运输过程中，押运人员应经常检查危险货物的包装、捆扎情况、数量和车辆运转状况。发现货物丢失，应立即向当地公安、交通、环保、卫生部门报告并及时查找。
第二十九条 危险货物运输过程中发生的包装、容器破损，由承运部门整修，整修费用由责任方负担；因货物变质或包装损坏无法整修而影响运输时，应立即报请当地道路运输管理机关及有关部门妥善处理。
第三十条 运输危险货物过程中发生事故，作业人员必须及时组织抢救、维护事故现场，并立即向所在单位及当地交通、公安、劳动、环保、卫生部门报告。
第三十一条 运输危险货物的车辆发生故障时，如维修时间及程度危及货物安全的，应将危险货物转移到安全场地，并由专人看管，方可进行车辆维修。
第三十二条 运输危险货物的车辆在运输过程中停车或过夜，应到指定的危险货物专用停车场地停放。
第三十三条 本市承运危险货物的车辆需跨省、市运输的，应到所在区、县道路运输管理机构开具道路危险货物跨省、市运输行车路单、路单应在规定时期内使用。
外地危险货物运输车辆来津，应持车籍所在地县以上运输管理部门核发的道路危险货物跨省、市运输行车路单，到本市公安交通检查站验证登记后，取得本市公安机关签发的危险货物通行证，方可在我市行政区域内通行；途经本市的，不准进入市区。
第七章 票据与统计
第三十四条 从事营业性危险货物运输的单位，应使用统一的托运单、行车路单等单证和危险货物专用结算凭证。
非营业性危险货物运输，应使用统一行车路单，并作为危险货物运输统计的依据。
第三十五条 从事危险货物运输的单位，应做好危险货物运输统计的原始记录，按期填写有关报表，经主管部门审核后，按时报送所在区、县道路运输管理机关。
市道路运输管理机构负责全市危险货物运输的统计汇总工作。
第八章 安全与防护
第三十六条 从事危险货物运输的单位，应负责运输作业人员的安全教育，建立健全岗位责任制和操作规程等规章制度，及时处理事故，并按期向市交通、公安、劳动、环保、卫生部门报送事故、案例报表。
第三十七条 生产和使用危险货物的单位，在新建、扩建厂房的设计中，应考虑为危险货物运输提供安全条件。
第三十八条 从事危险货物运输的单位，须配备必要的劳动防护用品和急救用品。
作业人员要穿戴相应的劳动防护用品，携带必需的急救用品上岗作业。
第三十九条 劳动防护用品使用后，要集中清洗；受一级毒害品和放射性物品污染的防护用品，应分别清洗消毒。
第四十条 从事危险货物运输的单位，要有专职医务人员负责对有关作业人员进行定期保健检查；并负责急救知识培训工作。
第九章 监督与处罚
第四十一条 道路运输管理机构的工作人员（简称运管人员），在执行检查危险货物运输、勘察事故现场、处罚违章等公务时，均应佩带运管人员标志，并出示《中华人民共和国交通部公路运输管理证》。
运管人员不得扣留装载爆炸品、易燃物品、一级氧化剂、有机过氧化物、一级毒害品和放射性物品等危险货物的车辆。
第四十二条 对违反本办法的单位，由道路运输管理机构进行批评教育，并可视情节予以处罚。
第四十三条 对无道路危险货物运输经营许可证、道路危险货物非营业运输许可证或道路危险货物运输中转许可证而从事危险货物运输及临时存放业务的单位，责令停止营业，并可对非经营性活动处1000元以下罚款，对经营性活动并有违法所得的处3万元以下罚款，无违法所得的
处1万元以下罚款。
对伪造、涂改、转让、出卖、借用道路危险货物运输经营许可证、道路危险货物非营业运输许可证或道路危险货物运输中转许可证的单位，收缴有关证件，并可对非经营性活动处1000元以下罚款，对经营性活动并有违法所得的处3万元以下罚款，无违法所得的处1万元以下罚款。
对隐瞒事故不报告的单位，处1000元以上1万元以下罚款，并责令限期改正。
第四十四条 对有下列违章行为之一的单位，处1000元以上1万元以下罚款：
（一）无道路运输证件，从事危险货物运输的；
（二）运输或临时存放危险货物发生事故不立即报告、破坏现场的；
（三）各种车辆驾驶室及各类客车（含公共电、汽车），装运危险货物的；
（四）全挂货运列车、三轮机动车、摩托车、拖拉机、人力车、畜力车、自卸汽车和其他特种车辆，违反规定擅自装载危险货物的；
（五）运输毒害品、腐蚀品和放射性物品的车辆及其设备、工属具，未经清洗消毒、排除污染，装运其他物资的；
（六）危险货物的包装、容器，不符合《公路、水路危险货物包装基本要求和性能试验》规定，承运人受理运输的。
第四十五条 有下列违章行为之一的单位，处500元以下罚款：
（一）无有效证件或伪造、借用证件的，托运或承运需凭证件运输的危险货物的；
（二）托运未列入《汽车运输危险货物品名表》的危险货物，不履行《危险货物鉴定表》规定手续，或假报品名、隐瞒危险性能的；
（三）应派人员随车押运，未派或委派不懂业务知识和急救处理知识的人员押运的；
（四）危险货物运输车辆无规定的消防器材、熄灭火星装置、导除静电设施的；
（五）从事危险货物运输的单位，不配备必要的劳动防护用品和急救用品，或对使用过的劳动防护用品不进行清洗消毒的；
（六）从事危险货物运输的单位，对作业人员不按期进行保健检查的；
（七）不认真总结事故教训，连续两次发生同类型事故的。
第四十六条 对有下列违章行为之一的单位，处300元以下（含300元）罚款：
（一）承运人不按规定查验有关证件的；
（二）收货人发现危险货物数量缺少、包装破损不做记录或拒收其余危险货物的；
（三）运输危险货物的车辆，无危险品信号旗或标志灯的；
（四）委派无道路危险货物运输操作证的人员，从事危险货物作业的；
（五）不使用危险货物运输专用的托运单、行车路单等票据的。
第四十七条 违反本办法从事危险货物运输或违章作业的个人（含危险货物运输单位的主要负责人），道路运输管理机关可视情节处100元以下（含100元）罚款或扣留、吊销道路危险货物运输操作证。
第四十八条 运管人员必须依照本办法秉公执法。对超标罚款、越权处罚、索贿受贿的，由道路运输管理机关给予行政处分或提请司法机关依法处理。
第四十九条 被处罚的单位或个人，对处罚不服的，可在十五日内向上级主管部门申请复议，也可按《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的规定，向人民法院起诉。逾期不起诉，又不履行处罚决定的，主管部门可向人民法院申请强制执行。
第十章 附 则
第五十条 本办法自发布之日起施行。
1998年1月4日
